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ABSTRACT
The paper develops a two—country model with flexible exchange rates and
perfect capital mobility, for evaluating the alternative macroeconomic policy
rules. Macroeconomic performance is measured in terms of fluctuations in
inflation and output. Expectations are rational, and prices are sticky;wage
setting is staggered over time. The countries are linked by aggregate spending
effects, relative price effects, and mark—up pricing arrangements. The model
is solved and analyzed through deterministic and stochastic simulation
techniques. The results suggest that international capital mobility is not
necessarily an impediment to efficient domestic macroeconomic performance.
Changes in the expected appreciation or a depreciation of the exchange rate
along with differentials between real interest rates in the two countries can
permit macroeconomic performance in one country to be relatively independent
of the policy rule chosen by the other country. The results depend on the
particular parameter values used in the model and suggest the need for further
econometric work to determine the size of these parameters.
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(609)452—5633International capital mobility is frequently cited by economists as a
serious constraint on domestic monetary policy. Since highly mobile
capital forces a close linkage among interest rates in different countries,
it appears that any one country's interest rate cannot be manipulated
independently in order to achieve an efficient domestic macroeconomic
performance. Although the classic Mundell—Fleming models with flexible
exchange rates show that perfect capital mobility need not reduce the
effectiveness of monetary policy, recent research on exchange rate
overahootng, on the direct nflatonary effects of exchange rate
depreciation, and on the beggar—thy—neighbor contractionary repercussions
of domestic monetary expansion, seems to have reinforced the conventional
reasoning that macroeconomic goals are difficult to achieve under such
circumstances. In reviewing the literature, Tobin (1978) concluded that
capital mobility is such a hindrance to efficient macroeconomic
performance, that we should "throw some sand in the wheels of our
excessively efficient international money markets." By making the
international capital market less efficient, domestic macroeconomic
performance might become more efficient.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a quantitative framework for
evaluating macroeconomic policy rules in a world of flexible exchange rates
and of perfect capital mobility. We begin by defining a criterion for
measuring macroeconomic performance. In early fixed—price demand oriented
models, the natural criterion for macroeconomic performance was real output
stability—policy would be effective or ineffective depending on whether or
not it could be used to stimulate, and thereby stabilize,2
real output. However, the resurgence of aggregate supply issues and
renewed emphasis on the simultaneous determination of prices and output
have created the need for a broader measure of macroeconomic performance,
one that includes both price and output stability. The static Phillips
curve policy tradeoff—in which macroeconomic performance can be measured
in terms of the level of inflation and output——could serve as such a
measure of macroeconomic efficiency, were itnotfor widely documented
shifts of this tradeoff. An alternative performance measure, in which
macroeconomic performance is measured in termsoffluctuations in inflation
and output, is used in this paper.1
The framework for policy evaluation involves the application of this
performance measure to a two—country model in which financial capital is
perfectly mobile, exchange rates are flexible, and expectations are
rational. Aggregate supply is modelled using a staggered price setting
approach, in which there are recurrent supply or price shocks in each
country. We assuma that all the shocks to the model are due to such price
shocks, abstracting entirely from demand shocks. It is assumed that the
two countries are linked by aggregate spending spillovers, relative price
effects, and mark—up pricing arrangements. Each country is assumed to
follow a monetary policy rule that can be characterized by how strongly the
money supply responds to price shocks. The model is solved and analyzed
through deterministic and stochastic simulation techniques which enforce
the rational expectations restrictions. Using these techniques we evaluate
hcw the choice of a monetary policy rule in one country affects the
macroeconomic performance of the other country. This provides a way to3
assess the importance of capital mobility for macroeconomic
interdependence.
The results of this evaluation suggest that international capital
mobility is not necessarily an impediment to efficient domestic
macroeconomic performance. For certain values of the parameters of our
model and f or certain monetary policy rules, changes in the expected
appreciation or depreciation of the exchange rate along with differentials
between real interest rates in the two countries can permit macroeconomic
performance in one country to be relatively independent of the policy rule
chosen by the other country. The results do not hold universally,
however. Interdependence can become stronger with alternative parameter or
policy configurations. Our results, therefore, suggest a need for
econometric work to determine the size of certain crucial parameters.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section I we review the aggregate
supply side of the model and show how policy can be evaluated in terms of
output and price variability using a rudimentary quantity theory model of
aggregate demand. In Section II we discuss a more detailed model of
aggregate demand which includes interest rate effects, and we examine
monetary policy in a closed economy version of this model. In order to
achieve macroeconomic efficiency in the closed economy-, policy-makers must
offset the effects of fluctuations in the expected inflation race.It is
shown that a real interest rate rule automatically provides this offset.
Section III describes the full two—country model and examines the
interaction between the macroeconomic policies of each country.4
I. AGGREGATE SUPPLY
The aggregate supply side of the model is derived from staggered wage
setting assumptions as modified to incorporate the price linkages that are
important in open economy applications.2 The staggered wage setting
approach has the advantage of incorporating forward—looking (rational
expectations) behavior, while at the same time allowing for realIstic
short—run rigidities that lead to a tradeoff between output and price
stability. These rigidities also guarantee the effectiveness of monetary
policy in stabilizing real output, despite the existence of rational
expectations. Nevertheless, an increase in the rate of money growth is
neutral over the long run, increasing the rate of inflation but not output;
thatis, the long run Phillips curve is vertical.
In general we assume that wages are set for iiperiodsand that 1/a of
allworkers have their wages determined atthe start ofeach period. The
equations of the supply sidefora single open economy (the home" economy
in this paper) can then be written:
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wherep is the log ofthe priâe level,'is the log of real GNP relative
to trend, w is the log of the average wage, xt is the log of the contract
wage set in period t tolastthreeperiods, e isthe Log of the exchange
rate,and is a "supply' shock. The hats onthevariables indicate5
expectations based on information available through period t.The"stars"
identify variables external to thehome country(the rest of the world).
For example, p in equation (3) is the average price level in the rest of
the world.
Equation (1) is the wage determination equatioi; it reflects the
tendency for contract wages to be bid up if aggregate wages or prices are
expected to rise or if aggregate demand, a repesentd by y, is expected
torise.3 The distributed leads in quation (1)extendfor n periods
because contracts last n periods. Theweightson the;e distributed leads
are equal because workers are asumed taveragefuture price, wage and
demand conditions over the a future periods of the contract. Parameter
5 represents the relative importance of pricesversuswages. In order to
preserve the long runneutralityof money growth, the weights on prices and
wages together must sum to one, asisindicated in the notation of equation
(1). Parameter I measures the sensitivity of wageadjustmentto demand
pressures. Equation (2) defines the aggregate wage in terms of contract
wages negotiated in the current and previow periods.
Equation (3) is the price equation; it states that prices are set as a
markup on wage costs, w, and the costs of inputs denominated in
domestic currency units, (e ÷p).The effects of exchange rates and
foreign prices on domestic price determination, as represented in (3), are
an important feature of the supply side of the model.It is through this
channel that foreign price shocks or exchange rate depreciations (increases
in e) have inflationary consequences. An alternative way to model such
external price linkages would be to assume that wages are directly indexedh
toconsumer prices that include the domestic price of imported goods. This
alternative would give somewhat different dynamic responses of wages and
prices to foreign price shocks or exchange rate changes. However, except
for the extreme case of perfect, instantaneous indexing, the effets on the
output—inflation tradeoff would be similar to those obtained in this paper.
At this point it is useful to review briefly how this aggregate supply
framework (with the closed economy assumption I) can be joined with a
rudimentary treatment of aggregate demand to generate a macro policy
tradeoff between output and price stability.4 Consider the simple quantity
equation "+ Pttn, where
tntisthe log of the money supply, and
suppose that monetary policy is driven by the rule tu in which
a is the accommodation parameter. An aggregate demand relationship
between Pt and can be derived by substituting the money supply rule into
the quantity equation, resulting in y —(1--a) Substituting this
aggregate demand relationship into (1), and substituting equations (2) and
(3) into (1), results in a two—sided difference equation in x, involving
both leads and lags. The leads from this equation can be eliminated to
generate a stochastic difference equation in x. The shock is the
disturbance in this relation. From (3), one can then obtain an
autoregressive moving average, ARNA (n—I, n-1), representation for p in
which the parameters depend on the policy parameter a and the structural
parameters 6 and r.Thebehavior of y follows directly from the
aggregate demand relation. The variances of both Pt and y can then be
calculated from these relationships. The properties of the variances are
such that the variance of Pt increases and the variance of decreases7
ascirises.This traces out a tradeoff curve; a more accommodative policy
(higher.cz) results in more output stability and less price stability.
The tnechanics of this tradeoff and its dependence on 0.canbe
explained graphically. Figure 1 illustrates an aggregate supply curve
corresponding to the difference equation for The supply curve shifts
with lagged movements in p and the shock term c. Theparameter
determines the slope of the aggregate demand curve, also shown in Figure
1. The slope of this curve determines how large the output effects of a
supply shock will be. A steep aggregate demand curve (ci near 1), results
in very small output fluctuations, given the size of supply shocks.
However, a close to I also causes a given shock to the aggregate supply
curve to persist for a long time. A flat aggregate demand curve, as
illustrated in Figure 2, increases output fluctuations while reducing price
fluctuations.
II. AGCR.ECATE ORMAND, INTERESTRATES, AND POLICY RULES
A more explicit model of aggregate demand than the simple quantity
equation is necessary in order to capture the impact of capital mobility on
the output—price stability tradeoff. Our approach to the demand side is
conventional and corresponds closely with that of the Mundell—Fleming
models. We distinguish between the effects of the real and the nominal
interest rate. The real interest rate is assumed to affect expenditures on
investment and consumer durable goods, while the nominal interest rate is
assumed to affect the demand for money. Inflationary expectations, which


















interest,are formed rationally. Je also allow nominal interest rates to
differ at home and abroad to allow for the expected rate of exchange rate
appreciation, a modification of the Mundell—Fleming model explored by
Dornbusch (1976) and others.
The aggregate demand equations for the home country can be written as:
(4) =—dr+f(e+ + gy
(5) tn —D= —bi+ay
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is the rate of inflation, rt is the real interest
rate, i is the nominal interest rate, and is the log of the money
supply. Equation (4) is an "IStypeequation in which total demand
depends on the real interest rate, terms of trade and foreign demand
(parameters d, f, g, b, and a are positive). Inclusion of the terms of
trade in this way permits short run deviations from purchasing power
parity. The elasticity is positive because exports are stimulated and
imports are reduced by a higher relative price of foreign goods. Equation
(5) is the money demand equation and equation (6) defines the real rate of
interest. As our analysis will not consider demand side shocks, we have
omitted shift terms from these equations. All variables are measured as
proportional deviations from secular trend and therefore have a zero mean.
In a simple quantity model of aggregate demand, the natural way to
write the monetary reaction function is in terms of the money supply, as
was done in the previous section. There are obvious alternatives to money10
supply rules when interest rates play an explicit role in demand
determination. Interest rate rules in particular, either a nominal
interest rate rule:
(7)
or a real interest rate rule
(8) rt rt
are possible characterizations of monetary policy. Note that (7) and (8)
as well as the money supply rule (m o. p) considered in the previous
section can be interpreted as "prices rule" such as those recently
discu8aed as alternatives to "inonetarist" policies. They state that the
interest rate should be increased whenever prices rise above target. In
this model the price target is normalized to zero.
Before turning to the case of a two—country model with capital
mobility, it is useful to consider the analysis of a closed economy.5 To
close the economy we set fagO and L. A reduced form aggregate demand
curve (in p—y space) can be derived by substituting the interest rate and
money response rules into (4) arid (5). This results in the following






for the nominal interest rate rule, real interest rate rule, and money rule
respectively, where h(a +
—1
As is clear from these equations, the rules differ in two ways:
first, in how they affect the slope of the aggregate demand curve, and
second, in how they offset the effect of the expected inflation rate on
aggregate demand. Both the nominal interest rate rule and the money rule
result in aggregate demand equations in which the expected inflation rate
has an impact. This is a disadvantage of these rules since it results in
another source of instability. This instability could be avoided by using
a money supply rule in which the money supply responded to changes in the
expected inflation rate. In other words, the money supply rule could be
written as m c Pt + Ifthe response of the money supply to
expected inflation were exactly equal to the interest rate coefficient in
the money demand equation, that is, if B—b, then the effect of a change
in the expected rate of inflation would be perfectly offset. The primary
advantage of the real interest rate rule is that it automatically offsets
the effects of shifts in expected inflation on aggregate demand.
The dynamic response of the economy to supply shocks with and without
the inflation offset appears in Figures 3 and 4.(The parameters used to
generate this and following simulations are reported in Table 1.) The
disturbance generating these responses is a one—period shock to the
contract wage equation. As a result of this shock, output declines and
prices increase over the short run before returning to their initial




PRICE SHOCK WITHOUT INFLATION OFFSET
FIGURE 4
PRICE SHOCK WITH INFLATION OFFSET


















real output during the third period following the disturbance, simultaneous
with the peak in the real interest rate. The inflation offset reduces the
magnitude of these output and interest rate effects, while increasing price
and nominal interest rate adjustments. In Figure 4, the behavior of the
money supply illustrates the intervention necessary in order to offset
changes in inflationary expectations.
The importance of offsetting variations in the expected inflation rate
can be Illustrated graphically. Suppose that a monetarist policy iS
adopted with a0 and without any attempt to offset expected inflation.
If a supply shock shifts the aggregate supply curve upward, as shown in
Figure 5, then output initially will fall and prices will rise. Because
the price effects take time to work through the system of staggered
contracts (in the diagram it is assumed that contracts last 3 periods,
a—3), there is a period of time in which the expected rate of inflation
rises. Without a policy offset to this increase, the aggregate demand
curve will shift to the right, partially reducing the contractionary effect
of the shock. Because the price level eventually returns to its previous
level (or trend path), there is subsequently a period of declining
inflationary expectations. This decline results in an increase in the real
rate of interest and causes the aggregate demand curve to shift back to the
left. The leftward shift in turn causes a large decline in output before
the economy returns to full employment. The responses of prices and output
are shown by the intersections of the various supply and demand diagrams in
Figure 5. The dynamic response patterns corresponding to those price—14
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The home and foreign economies are equal in size and are symmetrically
parameterized. The alternative parameter values shown in parentheses are
used in the moderate interaction simulations of the two—country model
reported in Section III. Parameter d is the semi—elasticity of aggregate
demand with respect to the real rate of return. At the equilibrium level
of the real rate, the interest elasticity of aggregate demand is
approximately equal to —.06. Parameter b is the semi—elasticity of money
demand with respect to the nominal rate of return. At the equilibrium
level of this rate, the interest elasticity of aggregate demand equals
—.2. This is a rough average of the estimates reported by' Goldfeld (1973)
and Simpson, et al. (1979).-4
0
-4
0output intersections in Figure 5 are shown in Figure 3.Note that there is
a large increase in the real rate of interest in period 3, the same period
in which the price level peaks and price declines are anticipated in future
periods. This rise in real interest rates causes output to fall sharply in
the same period as is shown in the diagram.6
The pattern of nominal and real interest rate movements is much
different when there is an attempt to offset the effects of the expected
inflation rate on aggregate demand.En Figure 6 we show the impact of the
same aggregate supply shock when the money stock is increased or decreased
to perfectly offset the effect of shifts in the expected inflation rate on
aggregate demand. In this simulation —b. The dynamic response
patterns for this alternative policy rule are shown in Figure4. Note the
smooth patterns of real interest rate movements compared with the wide
swings in Figure 3. For this smooth movement in real interest rates there
is a corresponding irregular pattern for nominal rates. Recall that the
aggregate supply shock first increases and subsequently decreases the
expected rate of inflation. If real interest rates are to move smoothly,
then there must be an increase in nominal rates in the first few periods
after a supply shock, followed by a fall in nominal rates below normal
before returning to their original level. The pattern of the money supply
is also irregular; The money supply is reduced below normal in the first
few periods and subsequently rises above normal.
In terms of failing to offset the expected rate of inflation, nominal
interest rate targeting is always worse than money stock targeting. With
an interest rate target, the expected—inflation induced shifts in the ISL7
curve translate into larger output fluctuations than with a money supply
target. Using the algebra of equations (9) and (11), this can be seen by
comparing the coefficients of expected inflation (d > hb).
As one should expect in a situation without demand shocks, there are
certain equivalence relationships between the various types of price"
rules. The response of a money supply rule to prices will have exactly the
same effects as an interest rate rule (ignoring the problem of offsetting
expected inflation) if ci (1—a) .Forexample, a monetarist
rule (ci —0)results in a positively responding interest rate rule with a
response coefficient equal to hid. An interest rate rule which is
completely non—responsive (ci 0) ,correspondsto a fully accommodative
money supply rule (ci 1)
A nominal GNP rule could also be contemplated within this framework.
A nominal GNP rule takes the form +
Pt
where is the response
of nominalGNP to price disturbances. Although nominal GNP rules are
usually discussed as if nominal GNP (or its growth rate) were unresponsive
to prices (ci —0),as we will see below this results in very nonaccommo—
dative policy. Clearly, a given nominal CNP rule is equivalent to a real
a—i
interest rate rule if ci . r d
The previous analysis indicates that real interest rate rules(ormore
generally, monetary rules that offset the effects of expected inflation on
aggregate demand) ought to work better than money stock or nominal interest
rate rules. In order to illustrate this, we have computed combinations in
output and price stability for the closed economy version of the model
using stochastic simulation techniques. These output—price stability18
points are computed under the assumption that independent and identically
distributed random variables Econtinuallyshock equation (3). By
stochastically simulating the model for alternative values of the policy
rules, the average fluctuations of output and prices can be computed for
these different rules——measured in terms of the standard deviations of
output and prices.
The results of this exercise are shown in Figure 7. The triangles
indicate output—price stability points corresponding to different monetary
policy rules. iUl of the points indicated by triangles correspond to
policies in which changes in the expected rate of inflation are offset.
Points on the upper left—hand segment of the diagram correspond to
accommodative policies, that is, policies in which the real interest rate
rises only slightly in response to price movements above normal. Points on
the lower right—hand segment of the diagram correspond to less
accommodative policies. For these points, real interest rates are
increased by a larger amount in response to price shocks. The scatter of
the points is due to the uncertainty associated with the stochastic
simulations, and could be eliminated by increasing the size of the
samples.8 Despite the scatter, a downward sloping tradeoff is evident.
Note that the fixed money supply rule and the interest rate rule are well
inside the scatter, supporting our earlier argument that such policies are
inefficient.
Before proceeding with the two country analysis it is useful to


















































































































































































































































































macroeconomic policy shock——an unanticipated permanent increase in the
level of the money supply. The macroeconomic responses to a one percent
increase in money are shown in Figure 8. There is a positive real output
effect which diminishes exponentially to zero in the long run. Prices rise
slowly at first but eventually by the same amount as the increase in
money. Both the real and the nominal interest rate eventually decline, but
the decline in the nominal rate is comparatively small. The nominal
interestrate returns to the initial level more quickly than the teal
rate. Throughout the simulation, the expected rate of inflation holds the
realinterestrate below the nominal rate, making the impact of monetary
policyon real interest rates larger than its impact on the nominal rate.
The plots in Figure 8 pertain to the closed economy parameter values listed
in Table 1. For other parameter values which we have experimented with (a
small y, for example), the nominal interest rate falls by a larger
amount. The decline in the real rate is always larger than the decline in
the nominal rate, however.
III. MONETARYPOLICY IN ATWO-COuNTXY MODEL WITh CAPITAL MOBILITY
We now consider the effects of capital mobility on macroeconomic
performance in a two—country flexible exchange rate world. We have already
summarized in equations (1) through (6) the basic elements of aggregate
supply and aggregate demand for a single open economy. (We now emphasize
that #l, and that neither f nor g equals zero.) To close the system we
need to add a corresponding model for the rest of the world, and to provide

















world. We assume that international capital mobility can be approximated
by the assumption of perfect capital mobility——that is) perfect
substitutability between domestic and foreign interest earning assets plus
instantaneous adjustment of capital flows. Algebraically, the perfect
capital mobility assumption can be written as:
(13) 1i+ e —e
t t t+1. C
In other words, the domestic interest rate is equal to the rest of the
world interest rate plus the expected rate of depreciation of the home
currency.
The aggregate demand and aggregate supply equations for the rest of
the world are given by:
* *n—i* —s n—i
*n-el* *
(14) x —— V+— 2.p+_2. y+
tn t+i ii t+tn t+t t
*1n—1. *
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Therest of the world equations (14) through (19), when combined with the
capital mobility equation (13) and home country equations (1) through (6),
form the complete model. How the model is solved depends on the exchange
rate regime. With flexible exchange rates) each country's money supply23
(rn and tn*) can be set either exogenously or by a policy rule. With fixed
exchange rates the money supply in only one country can be set, either
exogenously or by a policy rule, while the other country's money supply is
determined by the fixed exchange rate objective. No sterilization, in the
usual sense of the word, is possible with perfect capital mobility. We
will focus on flexible exchange rates in this paper.9
The dynamic response of- the flexible exchange rate model to an
unanticipated permanent increase in the home country money supply is shown
in Figure 9. These responses are calculated using the parameter values in
Table I that suggest a low degree of interaction between the two
countries. The effects on prices and output in the home country are much
like those in the closed economy model shown in Figure 8. The increase in
prices is slightly more rapid and the effect on output is slightly
smaller. Both real and nominal interest rates decline, with the real
interest rate declining more than the nominal interest rate. The exchange
rate in the home country depreciates in the first period by the same
percentage as the increase in the home money supply. Hence, to a first
approximation, the exchange rate immediately jumps to its new long—run
equilibrium value. There is some overshooting, analogous to that studied
by Dornbusch (1976), but this is very small in comparison with the size of
the jump to the region of the new equilibrium rate. Despite perfect
capital mobility, monetary policy in the home economy of this two—country
model has many similarities with monetary policy in the closed economy
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leads to a rise in prices.In addition, the exchange rate depreciates,
raising the rea,l exchange rate to further stimulate demand and adding to
the rise in the domestic price level.
The impact of the increase in the home money supply on foreign output
is positive but fairly small. This contrasts with the Mundell—Fleming
result that an expansionary monetary policy at home causes contraction in
demand in the rest of the world due to the appreciation of the exchange
rate.1° According to this model, the impact effects of monetary policy
have the same sign at home and abroad. The intuitive reason for this is
found in the price linkage or markup equations. The appreciation of the
exchange rate in the rest of the world tends to reduce the foreign price
level through its effect on import costs. This lower price level translates
into an increase in real money balances in the rest of the world, despite
the fixed nominal money supply. This increase in real money balances can
stimulate demand and can offset the negative effects of the appreciation,
unlike the Mundell—Fletning model where the fixed price level prevents the
real money stock from increasing.
Given our focus on capital mobility, it is interesting to study the
impact of the home monetary expansion on foreign interest rates. Because
the exchange rate jumps almost exactly to the new long—run equilibrium
value and then stays with very little overshooting at that value, there is
only a very small expected appreciation of the home currency after the
first period. Hence, domestic and foreign nominal interest rates cannot
diverge from each other by much. But recall that the nominal interest rate
in the home country declined by only a small amount. Most of the26
stimulative effects of the monetary expansion came from the decline in real
interest rates as caused by the increase in the expected inflation rate.
Because monetary policy works in this model primarily by reducing the real
interest rate, and because it is nominaL rather than real interest rates
that are linked in this model by capital flows, it is possible for monetary
policy to have powerful domestic effects.
We now go on to examine the output—price stability tradeoff and how
the world economy responds to supply shocks under alternative policy rules.
From the analysis of Section II it is clear that macroeconomic
inefficiencies will result from a monetary policy rule that does not offset
the impact of changes in the expected inflation rate on aggregate demand.
So that we can assess whether capital mobility impinges on macroeconomic
efficiency, we therefore focus on monetary rules for which such an
inflation offset automatically occurs. Equivalently, we limit our analysis
to real interest rate rules. Since there are now two countries, we need to
specify two such interest rate rules. Let these be:
(20)r rt
(21) r —ap
The dynamic response of the model to a supply shock in the home
country when ci— ct*—.2is shown in the charts in Figure 10. What is
perhaps most striking about this simulation is the small effect of the
supply shock on the rest of the world. The rise in prices caused by the
supply shock brings forth an increase in real interest rates in the home99 —
055 —
FIGURE 10
































country (as called for in (20)), but almost no change in the interest rate
in the rest of the world. Unlike the case of an unanticipated increase in
the money supply, the exchange rate is expected to change by significant
amounts following a supply shock. These expected movements in the exchange
rate permit a divergence between nominal interest rates in the two
countries.tn the early periods of the simulation, the exchange rate
depreciates and is expected to depreciate, permitting the interest rate to
rise at home relative to abroad. This rise is necessary if real interest
rates are to rise. Later on, the exchange rate appreciates back to the
long run equilibrium value, and the nominal interest rate falls at home
relative to abroad (as it should, because by this time the decline in the
expected rate of inflation has its own negative effects on real interest
rates).
These results suggest that the output—price performance that is
generated by such supply shocks might be surprisingly unaffected by policy
choice abroad despite perfect capital mobility. To test this proposition,
we stochastically simulate the two—country model under parameterizations of
equations (20) and (21) corresponding to different values of a and d'.
These calculations are made under the assumption that supply shocks
continually occur in both countries, that these shocks are unanticipated
and temporary, and that they are uncorrelated between the countries.In
other words, C and C are serially and contemporaneously uncorrelated
random variables. Only a limited number of policy rule parameterizations
have been examined in.order to save on computation costs." Variances
calculated for a and a* equal to .2 and .6 are reported in Tables 2 and29
3.In Table 2, we have computed the variances of output and prices
assuming a low degree of direct interaction between the countries. In
Table 3, the interaction is moderate.12
Tables 2 and 3 indicate in what sense there is relatively little
interaction between the policy rules in the two countries. For example, as
the home country moves from a relatively nonaccomxnodative interest rate
rule to a more accommodative interest rate rule, its output variability
declines and its price var1ablity Lncreases. But the effect of this move
on the other country's variability measure is very small. There Is some
indication that the rest of the world benefits from a more accommodative
policy at home (its performance improves), but the effect is second order.
This relative independence is illustrated by Figure 11, in which the
standard deviations of output and prices under the moderate interaction
parameterization are plotted for a ranging from .05 (accommodative) to .90
(nonacconimodative). These stability pairs are plotted first under the
assumption that foreign policy is nonaccommodative (a.6) and second
under the assumption that foreign policy is relatively accommodative
(a .2). Figure 11 suggests a slight positive feedback between the
policy choices of these two nations. When the home nation is interested in
pursuing an accommodative domestic policy, it can achieve more efficient
macroeconomic performance if the foreign nation also adopts an
accommodative policy. And when domestic policymakers prefer a
nonaccommodative response rule, macroeconomic performance is enhanced if a
similar policy is chosen abroad. The results reported in Figure 11.
























aThe equal size, identical structure and symmetric paranieterization of the two
countries insure that this tradeoff matrix is symmetric. This symmetry is taken into
account in reporting the results for the two countries. The average of the standard




































































































































































































































































































































































Thepurpose of this paper has been to develop and test a quantitative
framework for evaluating macroeconomic performance ina world of perfect
capital mobility. The framework is based on a simulation procedure fora
two—country rational expectations model with price (or supply) shocks.
The simulation results suggest that ifexchange rates are flexible,
capital mobility does not necessarily place constraints on domestic
macroeconomic performance and does not necessarilyprevent individual
countries from choosing their own monetary rules withoutinterfering with
other countries in significant ways. This conclusion isdependent on the
particular model structure and parameter configuration we choseto
investigate. Further research is required to determine the robustnessf
such results to widely different parameter and modelconfigurations and to
obtain econometric estimates of the crucialparameters in different
countries. 1334
FOOTNOTES
1SeeTaylor (1980), for example.
2Bhandari (1982), Calvo (1983), Dornbusch (1982), Rehm (1982) and
Taylor (1982) have previously used staggered wage—setting models of
aggregate supply in an open—economy framework. See Mussa (1982) and
Liederman (1982) for alternative 'sticky—price" approaches to aggregate
supply in open economy models.
3Because prices are partly influencedby foreign import prices, it is
important to include both wages and prices in the contract determination
equation in order to capture all the dynamic effects of a foreign price
disturbance.
4mis paragraph and the nextprovide a very brief overview of the
results in Taylor (1980).
5Rehm (1982) has providedan extensive set of deterministic
simulations to illustrate the dynamic properties of a closedeconomy model
like this one, and has also examined the case of a smallopen economy.
Calvo (1983) has studied a small, open economy model using continuous time
techniques.
6The dynamicresponse patterns shown in Figure 3 were computed
numerically for the parameter values shown in Table I using the extended
path algorithm described in Fair and Taylor (1983). The patterns show the
response of the closed economy model to a one unit shock to in the first
period of the simulations. This corresponds to a temporary unanticipated
contract wage shock, which we refer to simply as a "supply shock" in the
text.35
7The simulation results reported in the text takeadvantage of this
correspondence among response rules. The interest rate and nominal GNP
response rule simulations are generated using a money response rule
parameterized to yield the appropriate aggregate demand relations.
8The stochastic simulation results are basedon single runs of 500
periods for each parameter configuration.tn order to ensure stationarity,
the standard deviations are computed using the last 450 observations of
each of these runs.
9This model could also be usedto investigate the choice of exchange
rate regimes (fixed versus flexible) using the same stochastic simulation
approach. See Carlozzi (1982) for this type of application using a
different model.
t0See Dornbusch (1980,p. 102) fcr a discussion of this.
]--Johnson (1982) has computed two—countryoutput—inflation tradeoffs
of this type in a model without capital mobility arid withexplicit exchange
rate management, and has explored alternative equilibriumconcepts in the
choice of rules in the two countries.
12The parameter values for the low and moderate interaction
simulations of the two—country model are reported in Table 1.
t3Structural estimates can be obtained using theeconometric
procedures employed by Rehm (1982) to estimate small open—economy models
for Germany and the U.S.36
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